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developed lies in coverage, often only partially in
the former. In developing countries, regulators also
bear the responsibility of overseeing the completion
of infrastructure projects and accommodating
the needs of a growing population. However,
conceptually, distortions can arise from regulatory
actions akin to those activities arising from taxation.
Taxation can impose deadweight losses by
reducing quantities concerning non-taxed activities;
regulation can impose costs by limiting otherwise
optimal decisions of unregulated rms.
There are indirect costs associated with regulation,
and regulatory activity can also lead to failures,
particularly in developing countries (Estache & Wren-
Lewis, 2009). For instance, procedures may prove
ineective; decisions can be made with insucient
information, revealed of costly implementation, or
be biased to benet or the opposite of the regulated
operator. Certain decisions may be unsustainable
or inconsistent due to political interference, while
regulatory capture is an open possibility from
dierent stakeholders (e.g., rms, unions, organized
clients, politicians, etc.). Finally, regulators may not
always act benevolently or be capable of doing so.
The empirical importance of each potential failure is
a matter for further investigation.
In the 1990s, there were certain normative
assumptions surrounding regulatory agencies.
Nowadays, however, some of these assumptions
may have been relaxed based on experience, and
the focus is now on achieving ambition through a
“t to purpose” and “agile” (OECD, 2021) regulator.
The expression “t for purpose” is common in
modern regulatory jargon, indicating suitability for
the function for which it was created. The regulatory
agencies were initially conceived as “independent”
entities akin to central banks or judiciary. Trillas (2010)
discusses the regulator’s autonomy regarding
Central Banks. Endowed with some nancial
autonomy, shielded from political interference,
staed by capable and professional experts, and
possessing the ability to face and solve conicts
that routinely arise from the service operations,
regulators are entitled as arbiters between various
interests: consumers versus producers, producers
versus labor unions, producers versus politicians,
and current customers versus future customers
(Durand & Pietikäinen, 2020).
Berg (2013) points out the crucial role of a proper
institutional framework and technical consistency in
inuencing both the performance of the regulator
and the overall sector. His arguments are related
to institution building, which implies establishing
an adequate governance structure (concept
about the rules of the game) and implementing
correct substantive actions (in terms of game
development). Suitable performing regulators are
characterized by having adequate institutional
capacity (ability to decide in an objective, technical,
impartial, and integer way), organizational capacity
(to function eectively), and operational capacity to
enact reasonable regulations (Berg, 2013; Parker
& Kirkpatrick, 2002; Cubbin & Stern, 2004). The
expected outcomes of such regulatory eectiveness
include increased eciency in service provision (in
terms of both resource allocation and production),
sector expansion, investment levels, promotion of
competition, and quality of services, among other
variables (Brown et al., 2006).
Eective governance of regulatory agencies
demands clarity in roles and mandates, autonomy,
accountability, transparency, stakeholders’
participation, and community engagement, along
with the predictability of the regulatory interventions
(Cubbin & Stern, 2004). In the same vein, OECD
(2014) and IADB (2020) identify several best
practices as principles of good regulation, including
clearly dened roles, safeguards against undue
inuence on regulators, appropriate decision-
making mechanisms aligned with governance
structures, robust accountability and transparency
procedures, commitment to the task and
knowledge of the industry and its consumers,
adequate nancing to warrant independence,
and measuring of performance and impact of
regulations. The OECD has developed policy and
regulatory governance indicators for Latin American
countries (Querbach & Arndt, 2016).
Roitman et al. (2021) compile the principles of
regulatory governance following Brown et al. (2006),
identied as the classical model of independent
regulator plus the new roles added by the practice
and compiled by OECD in the Table reproduced
below.